Hence, licenses are associated with a specific fishing vessel and gear, and “transferable” only when the fishing vessel is sold: for each fishing vessel which is scrapped, a corresponding amount of kW is made available for new entries. While in France a license can only be transferred when a fishing vessel is sold, in Italy the “transferability” of licenses is done with a sell/purchase process on either the whole fishing vessel or on portions of it (carats). The owners could trade some of their “quotas” (vessel carats), thus keeping their names on the license but sharing their property on one

or more vessels. Similarly, a legal entity may own carats of one or more vessels without having its name on the license. In general partners recognize that fishing concessions are very similar to licenses. But the latter do not penalize fishermen by setting restrictions on catch quotas or on fishing selleck compound days. Bringing such factors into the equation would decrease the license

value. At the moment, fisheries rights are in general not assigned according to territorial, biological or economic criteria, although there are exceptions in the case of species under special management regimes. In Liguria Region, a specificity is related to “rossetto” MS-275 concentration (Aphia minuta) fishing. Catches for this species are regulated through a Management Plan, and fisheries rights are assigned on the basis of territorial, biological and socio-economic criteria. Number of fishing vessels which are allowed to operate, maximum quota that can be caught and total fishing days at sea are all strictly defined. Taking this experience into account, partners agreed that “Fishing concession” could only make sense if related to a spatial concept, that is to the exclusive rights to catch resources located in a specific maritime area. Also, the process of selling and acquiring TFCs should not be merely regulated by the operators’ individual interests, especially considering the weaker position of small and medium

enterprises, the pressures that could be made on the fisheries market, and the difficulties created by the general economic crisis. The problems related to speculations, to the excessive concentration of TFCs in a few hands (stronger Phenylethanolamine N-methyltransferase economic groups/bigger enterprises), to the safeguard of small-scale coastal fisheries have not been exhaustively tackled and solved yet. The initial Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reform proposal indicated that TFCs should be allocated for a period of 15 years. However, all partners agree that there is not an optimal duration for TFCs. If the limits in duration and validity are associated to mortgage duration for new vessels, the maximum duration will be 15 years. But this is not long enough for making long term investments in a fishing activity. If a fisherman invests his capital in a fishing vessel, he does not think that he will lose it after 15 years.